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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 70Abstract
The paper studies the in￿ ation rate associated with optimal monetary and ￿scal policy
in a number of standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal
price rigidities. While the focus is on Calvo-style nominal price contracts with a range of
indexation rules for constrained price setters, the conclusions have much wider validity:
(1) Regardless of whether nominal price and/or wage rigidities are due to New-
Keynesian, Old-Keynesian or sticky-information Phillips curves, optimal in￿ ation policy
requires the validation, that is, the full accommodation of core producer in￿ ation by ac-
tual producer price in￿ ation;(2) Optimal monetary policy implements Bailey-Friedman
optimal quantity of money rule.
No welfare-economics based argument for price stability as an objective (let alone the
overriding objective) of monetary policy can be established for the class of DSGE models
with nominal rigidities for which they have been proposed by Woodford and others.
JEL Classi￿cation: E3, E4, E5, E6.
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April 2006Non-technical Summary
The paper asks whether there are conventional welfare economic arguments in sup-
port of targeting any rate of in￿ ation, and in particular in support of price stability as
an objective (or even the overriding objective) of monetary policy. The model used is
representative of the New-Keynesian stochastic dynamical general equilibrium approach
with optimising economic agents constrained by ad-hoc nominal price or wage rigidities
along the lines of the Calvo model (as extended by Woodford), the sticky information
model of Reis and Mankiw or indeed the Old-Keynesian Phillips curves.
For this class of models the paper characterises the optimal in￿ ation rate, or more
precisely, the in￿ ation rate supported by optimal monetary and ￿scal policy. The paper
considers both unconstrained optimal ￿scal policy (where production or consumption tax
rates can respond to detailed microeconomic information) and constrained optimal ￿scal
policy, where these tax rates can respond only to aggregate information.
The key results are similar for both speci￿cations of ￿scal policy, and they do not
provide any support for targeting any low, constant rate of in￿ ation, let alone for the
pursuit of price stability. Instead, the optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation validates
(con￿rms or fully accommodates) the core in￿ ation process generated by constrained (ad-
hoc) price setters - whatever that is. By validating core in￿ ation (positive or negative,
high or low, time-varying or constant) with actual in￿ ation, the relative price distortions
emphasized by Woodford as a key reason for pursuing price stability are avoided even
when in￿ ation is non-zero.
The optimal interest rate policy is given by the ￿ Optimal Quantity of Money￿rule,
that the ￿nancial opportunity cost of holding money must be equal to zero. If the nominal
interest rate on currency can be set freely by the authorities, there is no unique consumer
price in￿ ation rate associated with the optimal monetary rule. By varying the risk-free
nominal interest rate on bonds (while keeping it equal to the risk-free nominal interest
rate on money), any sequence of consumer price in￿ ation rates, positive or negative, can
be supported by an optimal monetary policy. With an exogenously given zero nominal
interest rate on currency, the consumer price in￿ ation rate associated with the optimal
monetary policy is the consumer price in￿ ation rate supported by a zero risk-free nominal
interest rate on bonds. In a deterministic steady state that would be a negative consumer
price in￿ ation rate equal to minus the rate of time preference.
The optimal rate of consumer price in￿ ation implied by the Optimal Quantity of
Money rule is made consistent with the optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation implied
by the core-in￿ ation-validation rule through the appropriate choice of production or con-
sumption tax/ subsidy rates.
The proposition that optimal producer price in￿ ation accommodates core producer
price in￿ ation does depend on the assumption that there is no long-run (steady-state)
in￿ ation-output or in￿ ation-employment trade-o⁄. If there were to be (for reasons un-
known to the author) a positive steady-state association between output and in￿ ation,
and if the natural output level (the level of output supported under full nominal ￿ exibil-
ity) were to be below the socially optimal level of output, the optimal rate of in￿ ation
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April 2006Woodford￿ s arguments in support of the pursuit of price stability rely on two highly
restrictive assumptions. First, core in￿ ation is either zero or given by partial (lagged) in-
dexation to the actual rate of in￿ ation. Second, the analysis is restricted to a log-linear
approximation at the zero in￿ ation deterministic steady state - the only deterministic
steady state rate of in￿ ation supported by Woodford￿ s implausible core in￿ ation speci￿-
cation.
The key results of this paper, that optimal monetary policy should implement the
Optimal Quantity of Money rule and that optimal producer price in￿ ation validates core
producer price in￿ ation, are not robust to two important extensions. The ￿rst is the
introduction of constraints on the ability of the authorities to impose lump-sum taxes
or make lump-sum transfers. With such constraints, seigniorage revenues, that is, the
real resources appropriated by the authorities through the issuance of base money, can
become a valuable source of revenue for the authorities. When the interest rate on money
is zero, this may raise the in￿ ation rate associated with optimal monetary policy.
The second extension is menu costs, that is, the explicit consideration of the real
resource costs associated with changing prices or renegotiating price contracts, as in the
papers of Caplin and Spulber. The implications of menu costs for the optimal rate of
in￿ ation depend crucially on the details of how menu costs are modeled. If menu costs
are assumed to be particularly important for the goods and services that make up the
cost-of-living index, this would drive the optimal in￿ ation rate of the cost of living index
closer to zero. If, as seems more plausible, menu costs are especially important for money
wages (negotiating and bargaining over wages, whether bilaterally or through organised
labour unions and/or employers￿associations is costly and time-consuming), a zero rate
of money wage in￿ ation would be a natural focal point of monetary policy. With positive
labour productivity growth, zero wage in￿ ation would imply a negative rate of in￿ ation
for the cost of living, consumer and producer price indices.
The paper does not argue that there are no valid arguments in favour of price stability
(de￿ned as zero in￿ ation for some appropriate aggregate price or cost-of-living index) as
an objective, or even the overriding objective, of monetary policy. What it does say
is that in the popular class of models considered in this paper, price stability is not a
property of optimal monetary policy if either the private price setters are capable of
learning or the tax authorities are capable of implementing a simple feedback rule for the
nominal interest rate and/or the indirect tax rate.
This paper demonstrates conclusively that the New-Keynesian approach it surveys
does not contain the building blocks for welfare economic foundations of price stability
as a target (let alone the overriding target) of monetary policy. The search for a welfare
economic justi￿cation, grounded in solid microfoundations, for targeting price stability is
back at square one.
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The pursuit of an in￿ ation target as the overriding priority of monetary policy has become,
alongside central bank operational independence, the de￿ning attribute of a modern mon-
etary authority in an open economy under a ￿ oating exchange rate regime.1 The Reserve
Bank of New Zealand led the way in 1989 and 1990.2 The UK and Japan were early
converts. The European Central Bank has an in￿ ation target that dare not speak its
name. Of the leading central banks only the Fed has not adopted in￿ ation targeting and
even there in￿ uential voices are arguing that it should do so.
The most common rationale for the adoption of an in￿ ation target is that this rep-
resents a transparent and operationally simple way to pursue price stability. Given the
(mainly upward) biases in the real-world price indices used to de￿ne the in￿ ation target,
a positive but low target rate of in￿ ation can be seen as an observable, albeit imperfect,
proxy for a zero rate of in￿ ation of the unobservable true price index or ideal cost of
living index.
Abstracting from measurement errors, what are the welfare economic arguments for
price stability (de￿ned as a zero rate of in￿ ation going forward) as an objective, or even
the overriding objective, of monetary policy? In a recent in￿ uential contribution to
this topic, Woodford [58] has made a case for price stability as the appropriate in￿ ation
target, based on the optimisation of a utilitarian social welfare function in an economy
with sluggish price adjustment.
A key result of this paper is the demonstration that Woodford￿ s argument for targeting
zero in￿ ation is generically incorrect in the class of models he considers. I show that in
a wide class of models, which includes all models considered by Woodford, monetary and
1See e.g. Mishkin [47], King [38], Svensson [55], and Svensson and Woodford [56] and the other papers
contained in the volume edited by Bernanke and Woodford [6].
2The exact dating of the adoption of in￿ ation targeting by the New Zealand authorities is di¢ cult.
According to the Assistant Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Archer [?], footnote 3): "By
mid 1989 announced policy included a speci￿c target for in￿ ation and a speci￿c date for that target to
be achieved, a target that the Reserve Bank was following. But it was not until early 1990 that the full
formal paraphernalia of in￿ ation targeting New Zealand style was in place."
7
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opportunity cost of holding base money is zero - the Bailey-Friedman Optimal Quantity
of Money rule. This ensures that shoe-leather costs are minimized and that there is no
distortion in the relative price of cash goods and credit goods. Second, the cross-sectional
distribution of relative prices, freely ￿ exible or set by constrained price setters, is optimal.
This requires that actual in￿ ation validates, that is, con￿rms or fully accommodates ￿ core
in￿ ation￿ , de￿ned below. Third, the deterministic steady state level(s) of output (and
employment) is (are) either e¢ cient or independent of the steady-state rate of in￿ ation
(the long-run Phillips curve is vertical).
The class of models for which Woodford proposes that price stability is optimal are
New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with Calvo-type nominal
price contracts. In the Calvo model, opportunities to set prices optimally arrive ran-
domly. Price setters that are not free to set their price optimally instead use a simple,
ad-hoc indexation rule. The indexation rule adopted by the constrained price setters
generates what I will call ￿ core in￿ ation￿ . A central proposition of this paper is that in all
Calvo-type models, relative price variability is optimal when the actual rate of producer
price in￿ ation equals the core producer price in￿ ation rate generated by the constrained
price setters. Optimal monetary and ￿scal policies equate actual and core in￿ ation. I
refer to this as optimal in￿ ation validating or con￿rming core in￿ ation.3 The same conclu-
sion continues to apply when Calvo-style staggered overlapping nominal price contracts
are superimposed on staggered overlapping nominal wage contracts, as in Benigno and
Woodford [4] and [5]. Indeed, the proposition that optimal in￿ ation validates core in￿ a-
tion is also applicable to the "sticky information" version of the Phillips curve proposed
by Mankiw and Reis [45](see also [53] and [2]) and to other ad-hoc Phillips curve models
with the long-run natural rate property.
Zero in￿ ation is therefore optimal if and only if core in￿ ation happens to be zero.
3The optimal in￿ ation rate ￿ fully accommodates￿core in￿ ation would be another way of characterising
the optimal rate of in￿ ation.
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are assumed to keep their nominal prices constant - zero indexation. This rather ex-
treme assumption is also used in [4] and [5]. The other price indexation rules considered
in Woodford [58], including full current indexation (with or without complete contem-
poraneous information), full one-period lagged indexation and partial one-period lagged
indexation do not in general imply that zero producer price in￿ ation is optimal. For
instance, with partial one-period lagged indexation, zero in￿ ation is, not surprisingly, op-
timal if the economic system starts from a steady state with zero actual and core in￿ ation.
This is the special case of the rule that ￿ optimal in￿ ation validates core in￿ ation￿when
core in￿ ation is zero. Of course, for any non-zero initial rate of core in￿ ation, optimal
in￿ ation would not be zero under the partial one-period lagged indexation rule.
Woodford￿ s analysis does not uncover the general rule that optimal in￿ ation validates
core in￿ ation because his approach compounds a number of unnecessary restrictive fea-
tures. First, the analysis of his non-linear stochastic model focuses on the (log)linear
approximation to this model evaluated at the zero in￿ ation deterministic steady state.
Second, under the partial lagged indexation rule, the only deterministic steady state in-
￿ ation rate is zero. In addition, the target (optimal) rate of in￿ ation is restricted to be
constant. In combination these features conspire to obscure the general rule.
The general rule that optimal in￿ ation validates core in￿ ation of course cannot apply if
core in￿ ation and actual in￿ ation cannot be brought into equality with one another other.
Either the constrained price setters or the monetary and ￿scal authorities (or both) can
be the active party in the process of equating actual and core in￿ ation. For this to fail, it
must be the case both that private price setters never learn (that is, there is no learning
taking place that drives core in￿ ation closer to actual in￿ ation and equates steady state
actual in￿ ation and core in￿ ation), and that the policy authorities are unwilling or unable
to use their monetary and ￿scal instruments to drive actual and core in￿ ation together.
The optimality of core in￿ ation validation requires the economy to have the property
that, across deterministic steady states, the actual level of real output does not depend
9
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non-vertical but has a positive association between in￿ ation and real output (as it will
in the original Calvo [19] model and in [4] and [5]), there is a conventional welfare-
economics argument for a positive rate of in￿ ation (or, more generally, a rate of in￿ ation
in excess of core in￿ ation) if there are real distortions (e.g. monopoly power in the
output market) that make the natural level of output smaller than the socially e¢ cient
level of output. This argument stands or falls with the plausibility of the long-run (in
the strict sense of comparisons across deterministic steady states) non-vertical Phillips
curve. Both on theoretical and empirical grounds, I reject a permanent in￿ ation-output
trade o⁄ that can be exploited by systematic and fully anticipated policies - indeed even
across deterministic steady states. It is surprising indeed to see the roadkill of the Phelps
[48][49][50][51]-Friedman [32]-Lucas [39][40][41][42] revolution of the late 1960s and early
1970s resurrected in the ￿rst decade of the 21st century.
The paper studies optimal monetary and ￿scal policy and the in￿ ation rate associ-
ated with optimal policy in a standard of New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model. Optimal policy is derived from the optimisation of a utilitarian social
welfare function by a benevolent government capable of credible commitment. Consump-
tion, labour supply, production of market goods, price setting, portfolio choice and money
demand are derived from the optimising choices of a (quasi-) representative in￿nite-lived
household-producer in an endowment economy.4 For simplicity, there is assumed to be
a su¢ ciently rich set of ￿nancial markets to permit e¢ cient risk-trading and, in equi-
librium, complete risk sharing. There is Dixit-Stiglitz [25] monopolistically competitive
price setting by producers of di⁄erentiated commodities. The paper considers Calvo-
style staggered overlapping price contracts with a number of price indexation rules for
the constrained price setters (see [19]), and includes full nominal price ￿ exibility as a
special case.5
4Quasi-representative, because individual endowments may di⁄er and the tax rates faced by individual
household-producers may di⁄er.
5In an earlier and longer version of the paper, nominal prices set one period in advance are also
10
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the ￿ industry standard￿found e.g. in Woodford [58], as well as two key di⁄erences.
Cosmetic di⁄erences include the feature that the demand for money re￿ ects both the
￿ credit goods - cash goods￿variant of the cash-in-advance model and the Allais-Baumol-
Tobin shoe-leather costs approach. Leisure does double duty as non-market good and
credit good. It follows that there are two monetary distortions when the pecuniary
opportunity cost of holding money is positive: shoe-leather costs are excessive and the
relative price of cash goods to credit goods is too high. This emphasis on the role of
money is intended as an antidote to some recent theoretical work that over-anticipates
possible future technological and institutional developments leading to a cashless society,
that is, a world without a unique, distinct, government-issued means of payment and
medium of exchange (see e.g. Friedman [31], Freedman [30], Costa and deGrauwe [23],
Goodhart [36], Hall [37] and Woodford [58]). This paper￿ s maintained hypothesis is that
the means-of-payment/medium of exchange role of money still matters, although the
cashless economy (there monetary policy has become pure numØrairology) is considered
as a special case.
The key di⁄erences between the existing literature and the model of this paper are,
￿rst, the attention paid to the price indexation rule adopted by constrained price setters
in the Calvo-style price setting model and, second, the careful modelling of the ￿ non-
Keynesian￿e⁄ects of ￿scal policy - speci￿cally the rules governing direct and indirect tax
rates. Because the authorities are assumed to have unrestricted access to lump-sum taxes,
there is Ricardian equivalence: holding constant the sequence of real public spending on
goods and services, the growth rate of the nominal money stock and all non-lump-sum
taxes, the timing of lump￿ sum taxation has no implications for either nominal or real
equilibrium values. Real public spending is assumed to be exogenous.
The interesting ￿scal instruments in this model are the non-lump-sum taxes and sub-




Working Paper Series No 609
April 2006consideration of the case where the excess burden of monopoly power is eliminated by
production or consumption subsidies and the deterministic steady state level of output is
e¢ cient. In the present paper, there are both commodity-speci￿c proportional produc-
tion taxes/subsidies and a uniform consumption tax/subsidy or ￿nal sales tax/subsidy.
An immediate consequence of introducing a consumption tax is the need to distinguish
between the market prices faced by consumers (and the associated aggregate consumer
price index) and the prices set by producers (and the associated aggregate producer price
index or factor cost price index). Calvo-style nominal rigidities are associated with the
prices set by producers. The consumption tax (the only indirect tax in our model), drives
a wedge between consumer prices and producer prices. In conjunction with commodity-
speci￿c production taxes (the distortionary direct taxes in our model) they can either,
if the authorities are informed and ￿ exible, completely undo the ine¢ ciencies introduced
by any Calvo-type price setting scheme and indexation rule, or, if the taxes are restricted
to simple feedback rules, eliminate enough of these ine¢ ciencies to ensure that the real
equilibrium (relative prices, real output, real consumption, real interest rates) becomes
invariant under alternative in￿ ation rates of the consumer and producer price indices.
In the model of this paper, optimal monetary policy always implements the Bailey-
Friedman Optimal Quantity of Money (OQM) rule: the pecuniary opportunity cost of
holding money is set equal to zero (see Bailey [3] and Friedman [33]).6 If the nominal
interest rate on money can be set freely, the OQM rule does not pin down the risk-
free nominal interest rate on bonds. The rate of in￿ ation of consumer prices (and for
constant indirect taxes) also for consumer prices, varies one-for-one with the common
value assigned to the two risk-free nominal interest rates, but that common value itself
can be anything. If the nominal interest rate on money is constrained to equal zero, the
optimum rate of consumer price in￿ ation is that associated with a zero risk-free nominal
interest rate on bonds. In the familiar special case of a non-stochastic steady state,
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preference.
The rate of producer price in￿ ation depends, given the rate of consumer price in￿ ation,
on the behaviour over time of the consumption tax rate. If the nominal interest rate
money is constrained to be zero, a zero nominal interest rate on bonds is required to
support the OQM equilibrium. In this case the consumption tax rate can be dedicated
to neutralising the e⁄ects on the real economy of any distortionary price indexation rule
adopted by the constrained price setters. If the nominal interest rate on money can be set
freely, the nominal interest rate on bonds can be used to pursue and achieve the optimal
rate of in￿ ation of consumer and producer prices, even with a constant indirect tax rate.
If the nominal interest rate on money can be chosen freely, the validation of the core
producer price in￿ ation rate by the actual producer in￿ ation rate and the OQM rule can
be achieved with a constant indirect tax rate (and therefore with consumer price in￿ ation
equal to producer price in￿ ation), by using the nominal interest rate on bonds as the
￿ exible (time- and state-contingent) instrument. If the nominal interest rate on money
is constrained to be zero, the optimal producer price in￿ ation policy can, through the
￿ exible use of the indirect tax rate, be made consistent with the optimal consumer price
in￿ ation rate implied by the OQM rule when the interest rate on bonds is zero. Taking
the ￿ microeconomic￿ , relative price e⁄ects of production taxes and the consumption tax
seriously and endowing the authorities with su¢ cient information, ￿ exibility and sense
to use these ￿scal instruments e⁄ectively, therefore leads to conclusions that are radically
di⁄erent from those obtained by Woodford (see Woodford [58], especially Chapter 6).
Outside the cashless economy, zero in￿ ation for the consumer price index never char-
acterises optimal monetary policy when the nominal interest on money is constrained to
be zero. Zero in￿ ation for the producer price index only occurs for a set of parameter
values of measure zero.7
7This holds also for the Calvo model with partial, lagged indexation for which Woodford establishes
that, starting from a zero in￿ ation steady state, a zero rate of in￿ ation is optimal. Generically, the
optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation in the Calvo model equals the core in￿ ation rate - whatever
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optimal monetary policy, each of the following conditions would have to hold:
(1) Either there is no money (the cashless economy case) or the nominal interest rate
on money can be set freely to implement the OQM rule. This is practically unlikely
unless the authorities can be convinced to implement Gesell￿ s proposal for a carry tax
on currency (see Gesell [34], Goodfriend [35] and Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [16], [17]) or
Eisner￿ s proposal for the introduction of a virtual currency (see Eisler [27], Einaudi [26],
Davies [24] and Buiter [11]).
(2) The constrained price setters of the Calvo model implement an arbitrary price
indexation rule that supports only a zero producer price in￿ ation rate as a non-stochastic
steady state. An example is Woodford￿ s partial, one-period lagged indexation rule.
(3) The authorities target a constant rate of in￿ ation. They do not use either the
short risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds (if the nominal interest rate on money can
be chosen freely) or their direct and indirect tax instruments (if the nominal interest
rate on money is constrained to equal zero) to implement policies that make the real
equilibrium in￿ ation-neutral and the OQM rule optimal.
(4) The natural level of output is e¢ cient.
If the ￿rst condition holds and the authorities use their tax instruments and the nom-
inal interest rate on bonds optimally, a zero rate of consumer price in￿ ation is consistent
with optimal monetary policy, but so is any other rate of consumer price in￿ ation, for
any indexation rule.
This paper does not base the evaluation of the merits of alternative in￿ ation targets
in a non-linear stochastic dynamic model with Calvo-style price setting, on a log-linear
approximation to that model at a deterministic steady state with a zero rate of in￿ ation.
The results are global.
that happens to be. At a zero in￿ ation determininstic steady state, Woodford￿ s partial lagged price
indexation rule has zero producer price in￿ ation as the only constant optimal rate of producer price
in￿ ation. He misses the time- and state-contingent optimal producer price in￿ ation process supported
by his indexation rule.
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models considered by Woodford and in this paper, there are no robust welfare economic
foundations of price stability as an objective of monetary policy. Instead, in New Key-
nesian models, optimal in￿ ation policy validates (that is, accommodates or con￿rms) the
core in￿ ation rate generated by the constrained price setters￿indexation rule. The welfare
economic rationale for targeting price stability continues to be elusive.
2 A formal model of the benchmark economy
2.1 The Private Sector
There is a continuum of households on the unit interval. Each household acts as a con-
sumer, shopper, portfolio investor, money manager, worker-producer-supplier and price
setter.8 Household j, j 2 [0;1] maximizes at t = 0;1;2;::: the utility function given in
(1).9 The expectation operator conditional on information available at time t is Et; C
j
t is
household j0s consumption of the composite market good in period t and ‘
j
t is household
j0s; consumption of non-traded leisure in period t: The information available to each agent
is the same and can be summarised each period by a vector of state variables ￿t: The
period sub-utility function for market consumption goods, u, is increasing, strictly con-
cave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es the Inada conditions. The period
sub-utility function for leisure, v; is non-decreasing, concave and twice continuously dif-
8This ￿ yeoman farmer￿approach in which households produce and supply goods directly, and in which
only the potential labour time of household-producer j can be used in the production of consumption
good variety j; can easily be extended to include separate households and ￿rms and homogeneous or
heterogeneous labour markets.
9When Calvo-type price contracts are considered, we should re-interpret the model as one in which
there is a continuum of di⁄erentiated household-supplier types indexed by j; j 2 [0;1] and a continuum
of identical household-suppliers of each type indexed by lj; lj 2 [0;1]:
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0 > 0; u










0 > 0; v















; i 6= j (2)
c
j(i) ￿ 0;￿ > 1;
The composite consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz [25] CES composite commodity,
de￿ned in (2) with static elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1: There is a continuum of di⁄erent
varieties of the consumer goods on the unit interval. Each type of household produces
one variety. The amount of variety i consumed by household j in period t is c
j
t(i): Each
period, t; every household j is endowed with an amount e
j
t > 0 of non-tradable perish-
able ￿ potential labour time￿ . The household can transform this endowment one-for-one
either into leisure, ‘
j
t ￿ 0; output of the variety j market consumption good y
j
t ￿ 0;
or ￿ shoe-leather￿inputs into cash management, s
j
t ￿ 0; as shown in (7). Household j
consumes all varieties except the jth variety it produces itself.10 Each household j acts
competitively as a consumer, taking consumer prices ~ p(i); i 2 [0;1]; i 6= j as given. It
sets its period-t producer price pt(j) as a monopolistic competitor and conjectures that
the aggregate private and public demand for its product in period t depends, as shown in
(8), on economy-wide real aggregate demand Yt (de￿ned below in equation (46)) and on
the relative price of the consumption good it supplies, ~ pt(j); and the composite consumer
10As long as the price of variety j is positive, we could, because of the continuum of varieties as-
sumption, let household-producer j consume its own variety as well without changing any results. If the
number of varieties and the number of household-producers were ￿nite, this would not be the case.
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real private consumption, Ct, public consumption, Gt; and output, Yt; of the composite
commodity.11 The prices paid by consumers in period t include a proportional aggregate
sales tax or consumption tax at the rate ￿t > ￿1; the only indirect tax in the model. In
addition there are commodity-speci￿c production taxes (subsidies if negative) at propor-
tional rates ￿t(j) > ￿1 in period t on good j; so producer j receives per unit of output
sold: pt(j)[1 + ￿t(j)]￿1; while the consumer pays :
~ pt(j) = (1 + ￿t)pt(j): (3)

























The in￿ ation factor of the market price index or consumer price index between periods





and the in￿ ation factor of the price index at factor cost or producer price index between
periods t0 and t1, denoted ￿t1;t0; is
11The conjectured demand function (8) will turn out to be the actual equilibrium demand function.
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(Ct + Gt) (8)
Household j pays direct taxes and an indirect tax. Direct taxes are a lump-sum tax, T
j
t
in nominal terms, and the proportional tax on the production of its market good. The
indirect tax is the proportional sales tax on all consumer spending.
There is a complete set of time and state-contingent ￿nancial markets. There also is
money (cash or currency), an unbacked, irredeemable and inconvertible liability of the
government. The quantity held at the end of period t by household j is M
j
t ￿ 0: A unit
of currency held at the end of period t pays a risk-free amount 1 + im
t+1;t of currency in
period t+1: A unit of currency serves as the numØraire in all price contracts. Households
are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint on their purchases of market goods: a fraction
￿t(j); 0 ￿ ￿t(j) ￿ 1 of consumer goods purchased in period t by other households from
household j must be paid in cash; the remainder is ￿nanced with ￿ trade credit￿ . The
government is assumed not to be subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Leisure is not
traded; it has to be consumed by the owner of the endowment of potential leisure time.
As regards the cash-in-advance constraint, leisure therefore plays a role equivalent to a
18
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claims held at the end of period t is F
j
t :12
I adopt the Lucas [43], [44] version of the timing of transactions. The unit period, t,
is partitioned into three distinct sub-periods, each of which contains one trading session.
All realisations of random variables during period t are known to the households and the
government before they take any period t actions. During the ￿rst sub-period, household
j trades securities, pays taxes, obtains (extends) trade credit to ￿nance the shares 1 ￿
￿t(i); i 6= j of purchases (1 ￿ ￿t(j) of sales) of market goods not ￿nanced with cash.
Household j brings total nominal ￿nancial wealth (monetary and non-monetary) W
j
t to
the ￿rst sub-period. During this securities trading session, trades that require cash-in-
advance cannot be made.
Supplier j can economise on the amount of money he needs to carry over to the next
period from the sale of his cash goods by expending real resources s
j
t. The shoe-leather
technology possesses the property that for period t sales of ~ pt(j)y
j







t) in cash yielding 1+im

















paid for with credit instruments yielding 1+it+1;t: I assume that ￿ is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; ￿(0) = 1; ￿0 ￿ 0; ￿00 ￿ 0: When ￿0(s
j





t; then ￿ ￿ 1 and we have the pure cash-in-advance model with cash and credit goods
(leisure) but without shoe-leather costs.13
The government announces its taxes, public spending, money issuance and debt is-
suance for period t at the beginning of the period, before the securities markets open,
and pays interest and principal due on its outstanding stocks of debt instruments. In
sub-period one, when the ￿nancial markets are open, each household acquires at least
the money balances it needs to pay the cash component of period t￿ s planned purchases
12This does not include the one-period risk-free nominally denominated trade credit extended by
producers or the one-period risk-free nominally denominated consumption loans taken out by households
to ￿nance the shares of their sales or purchases of consumption goods that are not subject to the cash-
in-advance constraint.
13One interpretation of s
j
t is shopping time (see e.g. Brock [7], and McCallum and Goodfriend [46]),
but the interpretation of s
j
t as representing the real resource cost of active cash management by the
producer, that is, shoe-leather costs in the spirit of Allais, Baumol and Tobin seems more apt here.
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of market goods.Letting ￿
j
t denote the money balances acquired by household j during the ￿rst trading







Household j treats ￿t(i); i 2 [0;1]; i 6= j as given. As shown in (9), during the ￿rst
trading sub-period of period t, total ￿nancial wealth, W
j
t ; is allocated to non-monetary
￿nancial claims, F
j
t ; money, ￿
j






t; and the ￿nancing of the
non-cash component of its purchases of market goods,
R 1
0 [1 ￿ ￿t(i)] ~ pt(i)c
j
t(i)di; net of



































[1 ￿ ￿t(i)] ~ pt(i)c
j















In sub-period two, the ￿nancial markets are closed. Each household￿ s shopper pur-
chases consumption goods with the money acquired in sub-period one. The government
has made its consumption purchases with credit in sub-period one. The supplier in each
household j sells ~ pt(j)y
j
t; the part of its perishable period t endowment that it does not
itself consume as leisure or use up as shoe leather costs, to the shoppers of the other
households or to the government. It sets the factor cost price of good j and chooses its
shoe-leather input to maximise its objective function (1).14 It has paid a fraction
￿t(j)
1+￿t(j)
of its period t revenues as production taxes to the government in the ￿rst sub-period. A
fraction ￿t(j) of its sales to other households is received in the form of cash balances.
Beginning-of-period total (monetary plus non-monetary) ￿nancial wealth in period t,
W
j
t consists of the gross returns on the non-monetary ￿nancial portfolio purchased in
14If the production activities were uncoupled from the ￿ normal￿household activities (consumption,
saving and portfolio allocation and labour supply) by having ￿rms as distinct economic entitities owned
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t￿1: The end-of-period t￿1 stock of money held by household j, M
j
t￿1 is





































The set containing all possible values of the state of the economy at time t, t =
0;1;2;::: is denoted S: The state vector is assumed to evolve according to a Markov
process with density f(￿
0;￿) de￿ned by.
Prob(￿t+1 ￿ ￿





The initial state, ￿0; is assumed given and known to all private agents and the government
at time t = 0: Until further notice, the period-t state vector ￿t contains the following
elements: (1) all potential sources of exogenous randomness in period t: household en-
dowments, fe
j
t; j 2 [0;1]:g; real aggregate public spending, Gt and all tax rates, ￿t and
￿t(j); j 2 [0;1]; (2) the value of household stocks of money and non-monetary ￿nancial
claims carried over from period t ￿ 1; f(1 + im
t;t￿1)M
j
t￿1 ￿ 0; A
j
t; j 2 [0;1]g; and (3) the
period t value of the stock of risk-free one-period nominal bonds issued in period t￿1 by
the government, (1+it;t￿1)Bt￿1; where Bt￿1 is the nominal stock of one-period risk-free
bonds issued by the government in period t￿1: The k￿t - step-ahead transition function










k￿t￿1(￿k￿1;￿t)d￿k￿1; k > t
= 1; k = t:
A key requirement of equilibrium is that there be no arbitrage opportunities. In
every period t; there exists a one-period ahead stochastic nominal discount factor or
one-step-ahead pricing kernel I(￿t+1;￿t); which has the property that, if in period t the
economy is in state ￿t; the period-t price in terms of money of 1 unit of period t + 1






I will refer to I(￿t+1;￿t) as the period t nominal one-period forward price of money
- forward price of money for short. It follows that the price in period-t currency, if the
period-t state is ￿t; of Z(￿t+1) units of period t + 1 money contingent on ￿t+1 belonging





In particular, the price in period-t currency, if the period-t state is ￿t; of ~ Pt+1(￿t+1)
units of money contingent on ￿t+1 belonging to the set ￿ in period t+1; is ~ Pt+1I(￿t+1;￿t):
We can then de￿ne the period-t single-period stochastic real discount factor ~ R(￿t+1;￿t)
- the period t real one-period forward price of the composite consumption good
~ R(￿t+1;￿t) ￿ I(￿t+1;￿t)~ ￿t+1;t:15 (12)
15That is, the period t price in terms of the period t composite consumption good of a unit of the
period t + 1 consumption good.
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the expectation conditional on the entire state space, S; that is,
EtXt+1 ￿
R
￿t+12S X(￿t+1)f(￿t+1;￿t)d￿t+1: Also, It+1;t ￿ I(￿t+1;￿t) and ~ Rt+1;t ￿
~ R(￿t+1;￿t): Multi-period stochastic nominal discount factors can be obtained recursively




Ik;k￿1; t1 > t0 (13)
￿ 1 t1 = t0:
Equation (13) and the law of iterated projections imply that (as long as the informa-
tion set conditioning expectations at time t0 ￿ t contains the information set conditioning
expectations at the earlier time t)
Et0 [I(t1;t0)Et1I(t2;t1)] = Et0I (t2;t0); t2 ￿ t1 ￿ t0: (14)
Multi-period stochastic real discount factors can be obtained recursively from the




~ Rk;k￿1; t1 > t0 (15)




~ R(t1;t0)Et1 ~ R(t2;t1)
i
= Et0 ~ R(t2;t0); t2 ￿ t1 ￿ t0: (16)
Let A
j
t+1 = Aj(￿t+1) be the net amount purchased by household j at time t of the
security paying one unit of money if the economy is in state ￿t+1 at time t+1: The value,




















Two ￿nancial portfolios are of special interest. The ￿rst is a portfolio paying one
unit of money in period t+1; regardless of which state of the world ￿t+1 is realised (that







It+1;tf(￿t+1;￿t)d￿t+1 = EtIt+1;t (18)
The second is a portfolio paying one unit of the composite consumption good in period
t+1, that is, Aj(￿t+1) = ~ Pt+1(￿t+1) units of money, in every state of the world ￿t+1: This
de￿nes the one-period risk-free real interest rate on non-monetary ￿nancial instruments,
~ rt;t+1 :
1


















If (9) holds with equality (as it will when the household chooses an optimal pro-









































Because of (18) and the assumption that the interest rate on money is risk-free, (20)
can be written as:
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The household solvency constraint is the no-Ponzi requirement that the expected present





k ￿ 0: (22)
Equations (21), (12), (14) and (22) imply the period t intertemporal budget constraint



















































I assume that it;t+1 ￿ im
t;t+1 for all t: If not, the simplest possible arbitrage argument
would show that in￿nite risk-free pro￿ts could be made by households borrowing at the
rate it;t+1 and investing the proceeds in money earning a rate im
t;t+1:
In addition to the transactions role attributed to the monetary ￿nancial instrument,
money is also assumed to be the numØraire. With fully ￿ exible prices, the choice of
numØraire has no implications for the behaviour of equilibrium real variables. When
there are nominal rigidities in price setting, that is, rigidities of prices in terms of
the numØraire, the (bold) assumptions that (1) the monetary authorities determine the
numØraire; that (2) the monetary authorities have a monopoly of the supply of the ￿nan-
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is irredeemable and that therefore the authorities can freely set the interest rate in terms
of that numØraire, are of great signi￿cance for the real economy.16
Prices are set according to Calvo￿ s overlapping staggered price setting model, as de-
veloped in Woodford [58]. Each period a randomly selected constant fraction 1￿$; 0 <
$ < 1 of all household-suppliers has the opportunity to freely set the nominal price
of their product. The optimal price set by the ￿ free￿suppliers in period t is denoted
^ pt(j): The remaining share $ of household-suppliers (the ￿ constrained￿suppliers) sets its
price according to a simple indexation rule.17 When $ = 0; the Calvo model reduces to
the ￿ exible price model.














I will refer to ￿
j
t;t￿1 as household-producer j0s core in￿ation in period t: The only
restrictions imposed on core producer price in￿ ation, ￿
j
t;t￿1 are: (1) independence from
individual characteristics (26a); (2) recursiveness (26b); (3) symmetry (26c); (4) a natural
identity transformation (26d); (5) Positivity (26e); and (6) equality between core producer
16The more common set of assumptions is that (1) the numØraire for price and wage contracts happens
to be the unit of the unique ￿nancial instrument that ful￿lls the means of payment/medium of exchange
function (money) and (2) the state has the monopoly of the issuance of money and can ￿x the risk-free
interest rate in terms of money. The assumptions in the main text create a role for ￿ monetary policy￿or
rather, nominal interest rate policy, also in an economy without a distinct monetary ￿nancial instrument
- a ￿ cashless￿economy, (see Woodford [58]).
17It is here that the interpretation, mentioned in footnote 2.1, of j as indexing household types,
j 2 [0;1] and there being a continuum of identical household-suppliers indexed by lj of each type j; with
lj 2 [0;1] is helpful in rationalising the expressions for the general price levels in equations (49) and (50)
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April 2006price in￿ ation in the deterministic steady state, ￿ ￿; and actual producer price in￿ ation in
the deterministic steady-state, ￿ ￿ (26f):
￿
j
t1;t0 = ￿t1;t0 j 2 [0;1] (26a)




￿t;t = 1 (26d)
￿t1;t0 > 0: (26e)
￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ (26f)
Assumption 26f is a very weak, minimal long-run consistency or ￿ eventual learning￿as-
sumption. Assumption (1) is for expositional simplicity only.
Under the indexation rule (24) the expected value, in period t; of the relative price







￿t;t+1Et￿t+1;t + (1 ￿ $)Et
^ pt+1(j)
Pt+1
Therefore, when household-supplier j can freely choose its optimal price in period t;


















The optimisation problem for a household that can set its price freely in period t
involves choosing ^ pt(j) allowing for the e⁄ect of this choice on future expected prices, as
given by (27), and allowing for its monopoly power in period t and beyond. Current
and future expected values of the general producer and consumer price levels and the
27
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monetary and ￿scal policy instruments are taken as given.When pt(j) can be set freely by supplier j in period t; the optimality conditions for
household j￿ s consumption, leisure, shoe-leather and pricing decisions are as follows for





































t = 0; ￿ = 1 if ￿
0(s
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April 2006The household solvency constraint and the Standard Transversality Condition imply





k = 0 (34)
The Euler equation (32) has to hold for all t ￿ 0 and for all possible states at each
date. From the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate de￿nition (18) it then follows
that :











Likewise, from the de￿nition of the one-period risk-free real interest rate (19), it then
follows that:









When there are no nominal price rigidities, that is, when $ = 0; we have pt(j) = ^ pt(j)



























2.2 The public sector











tdj and sales tax ￿tPtYt and ￿nances any
budget de￿cit by issuing money or one-period risk-free nominal bonds. The aggregate
stocks of money and nominal bonds outstanding at the end of period t are Mt and Bt
respectively. The government period budget constraint is:







~ Pt = 0:
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 609










Real aggregate public spending in terms of the composite commodity, Gt; is distrib-
uted across the individual public consumption goods, gt(i); i 2 [0;1] in the same manner





















The government￿ s solvency constraint requires the present discounted value of its
terminal non-monetary debt to be non-positive, that is,
lim
k!1
EtIk;t(1 + ik;k￿1)Bk￿1 ￿ 0: (39)
Equations (38) and (39)imply the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint:





















Aggregate real government spending G is exogenous and aggregate lump-sum taxes
adjust endogenously to keep constant the real value of the stock of non-monetary public
debt at its initial value ~ b0, that is,
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Yt ￿ ~ #t (41)
where real taxes, ~ ￿; real non-monetary debt ~ b and real seigniorage ~ #; are de￿ned,




The optimal determination of the production tax rates ￿t(j); the sales tax rate ￿t
and the two short nominal interest rates it+1;t and im
t+1;t is deferred till Section 3. All
policy instruments are treated as exogenous here, with it+1;t ￿ im
t+1;t: Like Gt and the
individual and aggregate lump-sum taxes, all monetary and ￿scal policy instruments
can, in principle, be state-contingent.20
The nominal money stock is endogenous when it+1;t > im
t+1;t: However, when it+1;t =
im
t+1;t, the authorities can determine the path of the nominal money stock. In that
case, I assume that the nominal money stock grows at a proportional rate less than the
nominal interest rate on money. This ensures that the boundary condition implied by
the household￿ s ￿ standard transversality condition￿(34) and the government￿ s solvency
constraint (40) and ￿scal rule (41) can be satis￿ed when monetary policy implements the
OQM rule:
If it+1;t = i
m
t+1;t then Mt+1 = (1 + ￿)Mt; ￿ < i
m
t+1;t (42)
2.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
With identical tastes and complete ￿nancial markets for risk-trading, di⁄erences among
individual household behaviour occur only because of di⁄erences in the present value of
19The ￿scal rule (41) only determines aggregate lump-sum taxes. Lump-sum taxes on individuals T
j
t ;
j 2 [0;1] can be chosen by the policy authorities to achieve any distributional objectives they may have,




t dj = ~ Pt~ ￿t: Any rule for aggregate lump-sum taxes that ensures
that the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint is satis￿ed will support the same equilibrium,
holding constant all distortionary tax rates, public spending and nominal interest rates.
20For instance, as regards the nominal interest rate, the authorities have the capacity, in period t and
state ￿t; to set the period t price of a unit of money in any state ￿t+1 in period t + 1; that is, they can
set It+1;t ￿ I(￿t+1;￿t) for each state ￿t+1; and not just the risk-free one-period nominal interest rate
EtIt+1;t ￿ (1 + it+1;t)￿1:
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j
t: Leisure (a non-
market good) is separable in the period utility function from the consumption of market
goods. Shoe-leather inputs s
j
t are likewise ￿ e⁄ectively￿separable from the consumption of
market goods. Therefore, di⁄erent realisations of e
j
t will not result in di⁄erences among
households j in their consumption of individual market goods, i, c
j
t(i); i 2 [0;1] or in
aggregate consumption of market goods, C
j
t ; provided the present value of net lifetime

























For aggregate consumption of market goods to be representable as the choice of a
representative agent, it su¢ ces to assume that the initial value of the ￿nancial endowment


















: The left-hand-side of (43) will be
the same for all agents in periods t > 0 if it is the same for t = 0:







t; j 2 [0;1]: Aggregate consumption of good i is denoted ct(i); that is, ct(i) ￿
R 1
0 cj(i)dj: The consumption of good i; i 2 [0;1] is the same for all consumers: c
j
t(i) =
ct(i); j 2 [0;1]:
Equilibrium in the market for consumption good i is given by:
ct(i) + gt(i) = yt(i): (44)





t dj = Mt: (45)
Aggregate real GDP is given by:
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which con￿rms the conjecture of the monopolistic price setter for consumption good
i in equation (8).





t dj = Bt: (48)


































= (1 + ￿t)Pt (50)
From equation (49), actual producer price in￿ ation ￿t;t￿1 is related to core producer
price in￿ ation ￿t;t￿1 as follows:
21The selection of those who are free to set their period t price is random, and the probability that the
price of any randomly selected good j will be freely adjustable rather than constrained by the indexing
rule in any given period t is assumed to be equal to 1 ￿ !:
22Because markets for risk-trading are complete and because the period utility function is separable
in the consumption of market goods and leisure, an appropriate distribution of initial ￿nancial wealth
(either by chance or through the appropriate use of lump-sum taxes) ensures that all households have
the same consumption of market goods: C
j
t = Ct; even if di⁄erent households have di⁄erent endowment
realisations. Di⁄erent realisations of e
j
t will, however, be associated with di⁄erent equilibrium values
















Given exogenous it+1;t; im
t+1;t; Gt; ￿t and ￿t(j); equilibrium is characterised by equations














t)di if it+1;t > i
m
t+1;t



















































































































t = 0; ￿ = 1 if ￿
0(s
j




























































Equation (61) implies the following Euler-equation based equilibrium conditions for
the risk-free nominal and real interest rates:











































The boundary condition (65) is derived from equation (34), the ￿nancial market equi-
librium condition (48) and the government￿ s tax rule (41), provided the long-run expected
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real interest rate is positive, that is, provided limk!1 Et ~ Rk￿1;t = 0:23Consider the behaviour of the economy starting from any period t = 0: Equations







t(i): The boundary condition (65) places restrictions on the long-run
behaviour of the real stock of money balances. These restrictions will rule out most
de￿ ationary bubble solutions and liquidity trap solutions except those, like the OQM
equilibrium, where the nominal money stock goes to zero in the long run (see Buiter [10],
[13] and Buiter and Sibert [18]).
With exogenous risk-free nominal interest rates (or with any rules for the two nominal
interest rates that depend on real variables only) the model with full price ￿ exibility
($ = 0) exhibits nominal indeterminacy: only real output, real consumption, leisure, shoe
leather inputs, real interest rates, real money balances Mt= ~ Pt, relative prices pt(j)=Pt and
the in￿ ation rates ~ ￿t+1;t and ￿t+1;t are determinate. The nominal money stock, the
general consumer and producer price levels and the nominal prices of the individual
goods are indeterminate: there is no nominal anchor. When there are nominal rigidities
($ > 0); the period t general price level will depend on the predetermined value of the
period t ￿ 1 general price level, unless ￿t;t￿1 = ￿t;t￿1 (see equation (58)):
3 Optimal monetary and tax policy
A utilitarian government capable of credible precommitment maximises the sum of the
utilities of all households, that is, it chooses fIt+1;t; im
t+1;t; ￿t(j); ￿t; T
j
t ; j 2 [0;1]; t =
0;1;2;:::g to maximise (66) subject to the equilibrium conditions of the model, given in




t dj = ~ Pt￿t:24.










Mk￿1 + (1 + ik;k￿1)Bk￿1
i
= 0:
Because of the government￿ s tax rule (41). limk!1 EtIk;t (1 + ik;k￿1)Bk￿1 =
~ Pt limk!1 Et ~ Rk￿1;t~ bk￿1 = ~ b0 ~ Pt limk!1 Et ~ Rk￿1;t. It follows that (65) has to hold in equilibrium
whenever limk!1 Et ~ Rk￿1;t = 0:
24Because is sets It;t￿1 for every state ￿t; it also sets it;t￿1:
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3.1 Optimal monetary and tax policy with ￿ exible prices
Consider ￿rst the case of perfect price ￿ exibility, with $ = 0 and with equation (54)
instead of equation (30). Since the government has access to unrestricted lump-sum
taxes, it just needs either the uniform consumption tax or a uniform production tax to
implement a Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium. By setting the pecuniary opportunity cost of
holding money equal to zero, it reduces to zero the real resources used up as shoe-leather
costs. It can then use either of the two taxes (or both in combination) to eliminate the
distortion that drives a wedge between the private opportunity cost of leisure and its
social opportunity cost. The private marginal cost of leisure is below the social marginal
cost for two reasons. First, sales of the consumption good are partly paid for in cash
which earns the nominal risk-free interest rate on money, im
t+1;t; rather than the nominal
risk-free interest rate on bonds, it+1;t: It follows that, if it+t;t > im
t+1;t; the implicit private
opportunity cost of consumption goods produced for the market by the household is
below the social marginal cost. This ￿ Austrian￿distortion exists even in the pure cash
goods and credit goods cash-in-advance model which does not have shoe-leather costs
(￿0(s
j






t = 0; ￿ = 1): Second, the household has monopoly power
(if ￿ < 1) in the market for the consumption good it produces. The following two
propositions can be veri￿ed by inspection of the equilibrium conditions (52) to (65):
Proposition 1 In the model with perfect price ￿exibility ($ = 0) and an operative shoe-
leather mechanism (￿0(s
j




t+1;t ; t ￿ 0 (67)
1




; j 2 [0;1]; t ￿ 0 (68)
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in￿ation neutrality: any sequence of consumer and producer price in￿ation rates can be
optimal if the nominal interest rate on money can be chosen freely.
Because the price elasticity of demand for each consumption good is the same and
is also constant over time, the optimal subsidy rate is uniform across commodities and
constant over time.
There is no optimal rate of in￿ ation in the ￿ exible price model; the optimal monetary
and ￿scal policies (those that support the command optimum) can be achieved with
any sequence of in￿ ation rates - not just with any constant rate of in￿ ation - and with
any level of the risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds. The Bailey-Friedman Optimal
Quantity of Money (OQM) rule (67) requires a zero pecuniary opportunity cost of holding
money. This is achieved by equating the short risk-free nominal interest rate on money
and the short risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds. From equation (61), a unique
equilibrium rate of consumer price in￿ ation ~ ￿t+1;t is determined for each state, given any
choice of It+1;t with (EtIt+1;t)
￿1 = 1+it+1;t = 1+im
t+1;t: Speci￿cally, a unique optimal rate
of in￿ ation is de￿ned when im
t+1;t = 0: This requires it+1;t = 0 to support the command
optimum, so the in￿ ation rate under the optimal policy is determined by equations (61)
and (62) with it+1;t = 0.





















It is clear that Ct+1 = Yt+1 ￿ Gt+1 depends only on the exogenous random variables
e
j
t+1 and Gt+1: Its value in any state ￿t+1 is independent of it+1;t: Likewise, Ct ￿ Yt ￿ Gt
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j
t and Gt: If then follows from (63) that the period t risk-free real interest
rate, ~ rt+1;t is independent of the period t risk-free nominal interest rate it+1;t: From (62)
it then follows that the Fisher condition holds:
dEt(~ ￿t;t+1)
d(1 + it+1;t)
= (1 + ~ rt+1;t)
￿1 (69)
In fact, the consumer price in￿ ation rate ~ ￿t;t+1 in every state ￿t+1 satis￿es the Fisher








t+1;t; ￿t+1 2 S: (70)
Proposition 3 In the model with perfect price ￿exibility but without an operative shoe-
leather mechanism (￿0(st) = 0; 0 ￿ st ￿ et; so ￿ ￿ 1 and st = 0), a Pareto-e¢ cient
equilibrium is supported by any values of the policy instruments ￿t; ￿t(j); it+1;t and im
t+1;t
that satisfy (71) and it+1;t ￿ im
t+1;t:
1













It follows that in the pure ￿ cash goods and credit goods￿cash-in-advance model, the
command optimum can be implemented solely through the use of either the sales tax or
the production tax (or by the two in combination), with the two short nominal interest
rates i and im set at arbitrary levels, subject only to it+1;t ￿ im
t+1;t. The opposite is not
true: it is not possible to undo the e⁄ect of monopoly simply by using the two nominal
interest rates. Since i ￿ im; the lowest value of the opportunity cost for money balances is
zero. While this eliminates the relative price distortion due to a positive opportunity cost
of holding money, even maximal use of the two nominal interest rates cannot overcome
the e⁄ect of monopoly power.
When prices are fully ￿ exible, both the net e⁄ective subsidy and the interest rates
supporting the ￿rst-best are constant over time, across states and (in the case of the net
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e⁄ective subsidy) also across commodities.3.2 Optimal monetary policy with Calvo contracts under unre-
stricted optimal ￿scal policy
If the authorities can freely set state-contingent and commodity-speci￿c production tax
rates and state-dependent aggregate consumption tax rates, the ￿rst-best, Pareto-e¢ cient
equilibrium can be supported when there are nominal price rigidities ($ > 0) - the same
command optimum that is supported when prices are fully ￿ exible ($ = 0). Calvo￿ s
staggered, overlapping price contracts are neutralised by commodity-speci￿c production
taxes that equate pk(j); the price charged by the jth supplier in period k to ^ pk(j) - the
price he would have charged had he been able to set his price freely in period k. To
achieve the ￿rst-best, the production taxes and the consumption tax must also correct
the monopoly distortion that is present even when prices are fully ￿ exible. Either the
risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds or the consumption tax rate can then be used
to ensure that the relative prices faced by consumers are undistorted. Monetary policy
implements the OQM rule. By inspection of the equilibrium conditions, including (30),
the following proposition can be shown to hold:
Proposition 4 With Calvo staggered, overlapping price contracts and for all indexation
functions ￿t;t￿1; the ￿rst-best, Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium can be supported with the OQM
rule (67), ￿scal policies satisfying (72) and (73) and nominal interest rate policy satisfying
(74):
1











~ ￿t;t￿1 ￿ ￿t;t￿1 = ￿t;t￿1: (73)
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1￿￿ < 1; equation (72) determines the optimal net e⁄ec-
tive subsidy to the consumption or production of market goods whose price is uncon-












Equation (73) speci￿es that the optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation in every
period and in each state equals the rate of core in￿ ation generated by the indexation rule
of the constrained price setters that period. I refer to this as the optimal producer price
in￿ ation rate validating (con￿rming or fully accommodating) the core rate of producer
price in￿ ation. The consumption tax rate ￿t permits, if it is necessary, the uncoupling of
the consumer and producer price in￿ ation rates.
Given It+1;t; the rate of in￿ ation of consumer prices in each state, ~ ￿t;t￿1; is deter-
mined from the consumption Euler equation (74). Under the optimal policies, all real












Pt ; are independent of the rates of in￿ a-
tion of consumer and producer prices. Because period t consumption will in general be
a function of the period t state, ￿t; equation (74) or (61) determines for each state the
rate of consumer price in￿ ation, ~ ￿t;t￿1; which varies with the risk-free price of money for
that state according to the Fisher condition (70):
The full range of commodity-speci￿c and state-contingent production tax rates will
in general be needed to implement (72), since ^ pt(j) depends on e
j
t and on the other
elements of the state vector ￿t: The uniform (across commodities) sales tax is redundant
for meeting the production e¢ ciency conditions (72). The sales tax is therefore available,
together with or instead of the state-speci￿c prices of one-period-ahead money, It+1;t (and
therefore the risk-free nominal interest rate it+1;t = (EtIt+1;t)
￿1 ￿ 1), to eliminate any
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faced by consumers. Any combination of in￿ ation policy and indexation rule that does
not ensure ￿t;t￿1 = ￿t;t￿1 distorts the relative prices faced by consumers. It is worth
stating this as a separate proposition:
Proposition 5 In the Calvo model, the (unconstrained) optimal rate of producer price
in￿ation equals the core rate of producer price in￿ation in every state:
￿t;t￿1 = ￿t;t￿1: (75)
The optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation can be achieved through either of two
mechanisms. First, the adoption by constrained price setters of full, current indexation
with complete contemporaneous information, that is, pt(j) = ￿t;t￿1pt￿1(j) or ￿t;t￿1 =
￿t;t￿1 for all constrained price setters j: In that case any sequence of producer price
in￿ ation rates can be optimal: there is no inertia in the core in￿ ation process.
The second mechanism relies on speci￿c combinations of nominal interest rate and con-
sumption tax policies to support the ￿rst-best for any indexation rule of constrained price
setters. For any indexation rule and associated core in￿ ation process, including partial
and/or lagged indexation or other arbitrary indexation rules, the authorities can use the
state-speci￿c one-period forward price of money It+1;t and/or the indirect tax rate ￿t to
validate that core in￿ ation process. Equations (73) and (74) characterise the sequences of
indirect tax rates ￿t; ￿t+1 and/or forward prices of money It+1;t that support the optimum
rate of producer price in￿ ation. The optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation, ￿t+1;t =
￿t+1;t can, since It+1;t = ~ ￿t;t+1￿u0(Ct+1)=￿1u0(Ct) =
1+￿t
1+￿t+1￿t;t+1￿u0(Ct+1)=￿1u0(Ct); be
achieved with any constant value of the indirect tax rate, ￿t = ￿; by varying the forward
price of money, It+1;t; over time and across states of nature, or with any constant value
of the forward price of money, It+1;t = I, by varying the indirect tax rate ￿t over time
and across states of nature. Since period t consumption is state-dependent, the optimal
period t indirect tax rate and/or the optimal forward price of money It+1;t will depend on
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of producer price in￿ ation in period t depends on past aggregate information only and is
independent of ￿t: Since the rate of consumer price in￿ ation that supports the OQM rule
is, in general, state-dependent, either the indirect tax rate or the forward price of money
will have to be state-dependent to support the ￿rst best. I summarise this discussion in
two corollaries:
Corollary 6 Under full current indexation with complete contemporaneous information,
any producer price in￿ation sequence can be optimal.
Corollary 7 With an arbitrary indexation rule, the optimal rate of producer price in-
￿ation - the rate that validates the core in￿ation rate - will not be constant unless the
arbitrary core in￿ation happens to be constant.
When the nominal interest rate on money is constrained to be constant, say iM
t+1;t = 0;
the OQM rule requires that it+1;t = 0; and the ￿rst-best can be achieved only with time-
varying tax rates, unless 1 =
￿￿1u0(Ct)
Et[u0(Ct+1)￿t;t+1] for all t.25
With it+1;t = im
t+1;t for all t ￿ 0 we have s
j
t = 0 and ￿ = 1 for all t ￿ 0 and for all


















































Pt u0 (Ct) = 0 for all t ￿ 0 and for all j 2 [0;1]:
The OQM rule, the ￿ exible commodity-speci￿c production subsidy rule and the aggregate
consumption tax rule together support the ￿rst-best equilibrium.
25Proposition 4 also holds if, rather unreasonably, the producer price indexation rule is a function
of current, past and anticipated future rates of consumer price in￿ ation only. Consider, e.g. the case
where ￿t;t￿1 = ~ ￿t;t￿1: Equation (73) then implies that the optimal rates of producer and consumer price
in￿ ation are the same, that is, ￿t;t￿1 = ~ ￿t;t￿1; or ￿t = ￿t￿1:
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￿rst-best equilibrium if the nominal interest rate on money can be chosen freely.26 If
the risk-free nominal interest rate on money is constrained to equal zero, the optimal
consumer price in￿ ation rate is that associated with a zero risk-free nominal interest rate
on bonds. Unless there is full current indexation, the indirect tax rate will have to be
assigned to achieving the optimal producer price in￿ ation rate.














































dj = 1: (79)
The mean of the cross-sectional distribution of relative prices set by free price setters
is therefore the same as in the model with fully ￿ exible prices.
3.3 Optimal monetary policy with restricted monetary and ￿s-
cal rules
I now consider optimal monetary policy, and the in￿ ation rates associated with it, when
monetary and ￿scal policy cannot make use of information on current or past prices
and endowments of individual suppliers but is restricted to feedback from past aggregate
26The same holds true when prices are set one-period-in-advance (see Buiter [12]).
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in equation (30) will not, in general, all be equal to zero. However, the equilibrium
values of the real variables
pt(j)
Pt , Yt and Ct will be independent of the rates of in￿ ation
of consumer prices and producer prices, if there exist restricted ￿scal rules that ensure











not depend on either rate of in￿ ation. The reason such in￿ ation-neutral equilibria are
interesting is that, provided the deterministic steady state level of output is e¢ cient,
constrained-optimal equilibria must be in￿ ation-neutral.27 It is also easily shown that
an in￿ ation-neutral equilibrium that satis￿es the OQM condition and the condition that
the deterministic steady state level of output is e¢ cient, is constrained-optimal.
I therefore consider ￿rst the details of a number of alternative indexation rules ￿k;t and
the arguments that support or detract from their plausibility, to determine whether the
private price setting mechanism is itself ￿ producer-price-in￿ ation-neutral￿(given constant
production and consumption tax rates and constant risk-free nominal interest rates).
Second, I check whether there are simple monetary and ￿scal feedback rules that can
neutralise any in￿ ation non-neutralities that may be present in the private price setting
mechanism.
In what follows, I establish the two following propositions and o⁄er arguments in
support of the view that the long-run equilibrium distribution of relative prices ought
not to depend on the indexation rule even for constant values of the nominal and ￿scal
policy instruments.
Proposition 8 Regardless of the speci￿cation of the private indexation rule and the as-
sociated core in￿ation process, the authorities can always use either the indirect tax rate
27Constrained-optimal equilibria are equilibria that are optimal given the constraint that ￿scal and
monetary instruments can only respond to aggregate variables.
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and (62) or (61), to eliminate any in￿uence of producer and consumer price in￿ation
rates on the real equilibrium. The uniform production subsidy given in (80) addresses
e¢ ciency losses due to monopoly power.
1




for all j (80)
Optimal monetary policy is then again de￿ned by the OQM rule (67), even if the ￿scal
policy rules are not ￿exible enough to support the ￿rst-best equilibrium.
Proposition 9 If the nominal interest rate on money is constrained to equal zero, the
OQM rule requires it+1;t = 0 and the optimal rate of producer price in￿ation ￿t;t￿1 =
￿t;t￿1 can, in general28 only be achieved using a time-varying indirect tax rate. If the
period t indexation rule depends on ￿t, the indirect tax rate also has to depend on ￿t:




















for constrained price setters. (82)
The ￿scal rule (73) requires either that the constrained price setters always use the
full current indexation rule with complete contemporaneous information (￿t;t￿1 ￿ ￿t;t￿1),
or that the authorities know the private sector￿ s indexation rule ￿t;t￿1 and are able to
observe the variables included in the private sector￿ s indexation rule. It is not necessary
for the authorities to know, when they make the credible announcement (in period t or
earlier) of the tax rule (73) for period t, the values of all the variables (dated period t or









t+1)￿t;t+1) for all t
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period t or at some later date. Any payments from the private sector to the public sector
(or vice versa) associated with the tax rule can be delayed until the required information
(the realisations of the arguments in the rule) has become known to and veri￿able by
both parties involved in the tax or subsidy payment. As long as the present values of
the payments do not depend on their timing (and they will not in the complete markets
framework assumed here), the tax rules will have their intended e⁄ect even if the public
sector were to observe aggregate variables later than the private sector - itself probably
an unlikely scenario.
Under optimal monetary policy and constrained optimal ￿scal policy, the free price
setter￿ s optimality condition is again given by (76). With constrained ￿scal policy, how-







Pk = 0 for all
k ￿ t ￿ 0: Instead, conditions (80) will, given the core in￿ ation validation rule (73) and







Pk = 0 ￿ on average￿ .
































As before, real consumer prices (and real prices at factor cost) satisfy:









Given the interest rate policy (if im
t;t￿1 can be set freely) and/or the indirect tax rate









Equations (83) and (84) imply that
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>From (83) it is clear that the tax rule cannot achieve full productive e¢ ciency, since
a fraction $ of producers is locked into last period￿ s relative prices. However, the mean
of the distribution of the relative prices set by free price setters is the same as in the
unconstrained optimal equilibrium.
Under this optimal monetary policy and constrained optimal ￿scal policy combination,
which can be implemented for any indexation rule, the rate of in￿ ation of the consumer
price index is again indeterminate if the nominal interest rate on money can be chosen
freely, because in that case the common risk-free nominal interest rates on bonds and
money can be chosen freely.
3.4 What indexation rule?
The indexation rules ￿k;t considered in what follows (and indeed the entire Calvo-class
of price setting models) are ad-hoc, in the sense of not being derived as decision rules of
purposefully acting agents starting from acceptable primitive assumptions (tastes, tech-
nology, endowments, information, contract enforcement institutions). Nevertheless, cer-
tain restrictions on permissible indexation rules can reasonably be imposed. One way
to ￿ stress test￿an ad-hoc indexation rule is to evaluate its performance in very simple,
well-understood environments. As this paper investigates which in￿ ation target (not
necessarily constant) would be justi￿able on utilitarian welfare-economic grounds, the in-
dexation rule should be able to support more than one constant rate of in￿ ation (indeed
a non-trivial range of in￿ ation rates) in a deterministic steady state. In this deterministic
steady-state benchmark, all sources of uncertainty, other than the random allocation of
suppliers to the free and constrained groups, are abstracted from and government spend-
ing Gt , individual endowments e
j
t; the consumption tax rate ￿t and output tax rates
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t are constant:293.4.1 Woodford￿ s indexation rule
The indexation rule proposed by Woodford [58], which plays a central role in his argument
for price stability (zero in￿ ation) as the appropriate target for monetary policy, is given



























It is clear that this indexation rule (85), although it respects the ￿ homogeneity pos-
tulate￿ , is a most unfortunate choice as the maintained hypothesis in an analysis of the
welfare consequences of alternative in￿ ation targets. Unless ￿ = 1 or ￿t;t￿1 = ￿
￿
t￿1;t￿2;
the rule (85) introduces an arbitrary source of permanent in￿ ation non-neutrality into






￿t;t￿1 and the real equi-
librium is invariant under alternative constant rates of in￿ ation. When 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; under
any constant non-zero rate of in￿ ation, ever-widening relative price distortions result,
mechanically, from the application of the indexation rule (85): (85) only satis￿es (26f)
29This can easily be extended to steady states with a constant growth rate of the endowments and of
GDP.
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when steady state producer price in￿ ation is zero.Cross-sectional real commodity prices satisfy the following relationship under Wood-














If ￿t;t￿1 = ￿
￿
t￿1;t￿2 (actual in￿ ation validates the core in￿ ation process), which in-
cludes as a special case the zero in￿ ation case ￿t;t￿1 = ￿t￿1;t￿2 = 1); then, under the
Woodford indexation rule, the relative prices of those suppliers that are free to set their







dj = 1; which is a property shared by the equi-
librium relative prices under full price ￿ exibility. The prices set by the constrained




Pt￿1 : However, if
￿t;t￿1 6= ￿
￿



















if ￿ T 1: For instance, with a positive, constant rate of in￿ ation and over-indexing
(￿ > 1); a constrained price setter￿ s relative price will be rising over time for as long
as he remains constrained. It will also be above-average cross-sectionally, forcing the
relative prices of the free price setters to be below-average. If ￿ < 1; the price setter
would be systematically and persistently ￿ under-indexed￿ , with his relative price declining
exponentially to zero for as long as he is not free to set his price:
The indexation rule (85) therefore ought to be rejected because it implies unreason-
able, indeed irrational, behaviour by constrained price setters in simple, well-understood
environments in which over-indexing or under-indexing cannot be rationalised with an
appeal to signal extraction, risk sharing or impaired learning ability. Even the mildest
version of the Lucas critique would imply that the indexation rule in (85) would not
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a constant but non-zero rate of in￿ ation. If the ￿rm stuck to the indexation rule, the
￿rm would be unlikely to survive.
Of course, even when ￿ 6= 1; the implementation of simple policy rules for the nomi-
nal interest rate and/or the indirect tax rate (73) will make the price setting mechanism
in￿ ation-neutral. Under (73), it will always be the case that producer price in￿ ation sat-
is￿es ￿t;t￿1 = ￿
￿





Thus, regardless of whether Woodford￿ s indexation rule is dropped and replaced by some-
thing more sensible or kept and neutralised/validated by a simple indirect tax rule or nom-
inal interest rate rule, price stability (of either the consumer price level or the producer
price level) is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for monetary policy to be optimal. When
the nominal interest rate on money is constrained to be zero, consumer price stability is
inconsistent with optimal monetary policy, except in a cashless economy.
3.4.2 Ad-hoc indexation rules that permit steady states with non-zero in￿ a-
tion rates
























31This can easily be generalised to an autoregressive-moving average process like A(L)￿t;t￿1 =
B(L)￿t;t￿1 where A(L) and B(L) are polynominal distributed lag functions with A(1)￿1B(1) = 1:
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stant nominal price is maintained by the constrained suppliers (￿ = ￿ = 0) and Wood-
ford￿ s formulation (￿ = 0). As I am only interested in economic systems that can
support, in the deterministic special case, steady states with more than one constant rate
of in￿ ation, I will concentrate on the case where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿:
The indexation rule given in (88) is also subject to the Lucas critique. Unless either
the core in￿ ation process is validated (￿t;t￿1 = (￿t￿1;t￿2)
￿
1￿￿); or ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0; the
relative price of good j; pt(j)=Pt will be subject to ine¢ cient cross-sectional and time-
series variation. Any constant aggregate rate of in￿ ation would keep the relative price of







. This implies a systematic and persistent decline in the relative price of
constrained suppliers if the economy-wide rate of in￿ ation were rising systematically and
persistently, if ￿ > 0: The indexation rule (88) therefore only makes sense if there is no
signi￿cant trend (positive or negative) in the rate of in￿ ation.
A possible attractive generalisation of (88) would be along the lines of John Flem-
ming￿ s ￿ gearing hypothesis￿(see Flemming [29]). Flemming￿ s hypothesis, proposed as a
theory of in￿ ation expectation formation rather than as a theory of indexation rules, held
that as long as the price level was stationary, a simple, ad-hoc forecasting rule (indexation
rule for our purposes) relating the predicted price level to past realisations of the price
level (subject to a homogeneity constraint) would be adopted. For indexation rules that
only use aggregate information from the current and most recent past period, we would,






If a trend were to appear in the price level but not in the rate of in￿ ation (if the price level
were to become non-stationary but the rate of in￿ ation remained stationary), forecasts
would ￿ shift up a gear￿(because learning takes place) and a forecasting rule relating the
52
ECB
Working Paper Series No 609
April 2006forecast of the in￿ ation rate to the past behaviour of the in￿ ation rate would be adopted.
The indexation rule (88) is an example. If the in￿ ation rate became non-stationary but
the change in the rate of in￿ ation remained stationary, the forecasting rule would again











A statistical description of Flemming￿ s gearing hypothesis as applied to indexation
rules would be that the economy-wide in￿ ation rate and the supplier￿ s core in￿ ation rate
generated by the indexation rule are ￿ co-integrated￿ . The indexation rule (or the in￿ a-
tion expectation formation process), without meeting the full-￿ edged model-consistency
requirement of the Lucas critique, does meet the less demanding, but possibly more
relevant, requirement that it should not be ￿ o⁄￿by an order of integration or more.
With constant indirect tax rates, the indexation rule (88) makes the real equilibrium
invariant to any constant in￿ ation rate of producer prices if ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: It makes the
real equilibrium invariant to any rate of in￿ ation, constant or not, if in addition ￿ = 1 -
the case of full current indexation. Regardless of the values of ￿ and ￿; implementation
of the ￿scal rule (73) and/or appropriate use of the nominal interest rate will make the





3.4.3 Full current indexation
As noted in Woodford [58], pp. 214-215, all in￿ ation inertia vanishes (with constant
values of all policy instruments) in Calvo-type models with full current indexation. This
corresponds to the case ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0 in equation (88).
With zero production and consumption tax rates, there remain three distortions when
monetary policy is exogenous: (1) monopoly power; (2) insu¢ cient relative price ￿ ex-
ibility, which prevents constrained suppliers from responding with their prices to idio-
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balances (when i > im). Since the real equilibrium under full current indexation is inde-
pendent of the rate of in￿ ation, optimal monetary can be dedicated to implementing the
OQM rule.
3.4.4 Full current indexation as relative price contracting
The fact that, in period t; the price instrument of supplier j is the price of good j in terms
of period t money, pt(j); does not mean that supplier j is unaware that it is the relative
price of good j; pt(j)=Pt; rather than its nominal price, that determines the demand for
his product . Nominal price setting, and the nominal inertia that may result from it are
not money illusion. Since it is the relative price of good j that matters to supplier j
, a price indexation rule for supplier j could be plausibly argued to be a relative price
contracting rule, that is, a rule that is motivated by a desire to achieve an acceptable
or reasonable value for this relative price during the periods that supplier j is not free
to set the relative price of his product. As a simple example consider the relative price


























The full current indexation rule for the nominal producer price is the special case
of this relative price contracting rule (89) when ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ = 0: It can be contrasted with
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kept constant until the next random opportunity for changing that price (￿ = ￿ = 0 in
equation (88)) - a model of staggered overlapping nominal price setting similar in spirit
and in many of its key properties to Taylor￿ s model of staggered, overlapping two-period
nominal wage contracts (Taylor [57]).
The natural interpretation of Calvo￿ s nominal price setting model with full indexation
(￿ = 1; ￿ = 0 in equation (88)) is that household j, when it is among the randomly
selected households whose price contracts can be altered in period t; sets a constant
relative price for good j in terms of the composite consumption good, to remain in
e⁄ect until the next random opportunity for changing this relative price comes along.
This relative price setting model is in the spirit of Buiter and Jewitt [14], and Buiter
and Miller [15]. Buiter and Jewitt [14] extended Taylor￿ s [57] analysis of staggered
overlapping nominal wage contracts (motivated with a concern by workers for relative
money wages) by developing and analysing a model of staggered overlapping real wage
contracts (motivated with a concern by workers for relative real wages). Buiter and Miller
[15] developed a continuous time version of a Calvo-type model in which new contracts
￿x (until the next random opportunity for re-contracting) not the nominal value of the
contract price but the proportional rate of change of the nominal contract price.
An even closer approximation to the key properties of the Buiter and Jewitt and Buiter
and Miller models would be to take the ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ = 0 version of equation (89) and to lag the




Pt￿2 . This can be written as a nominal
price indexation rule with full but one-period-lagged indexation: pt(j) = pt￿1(j)￿t￿1;t￿2,
which is also the special case of (88) with ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1: The resulting model, like
the Buiter-Miller model and the 2-period version of the Buiter-Jewitt model, is in all
relevant respects the same as the Calvo model with full one-period lagged indexation
considered by Christiano et. al.[22], Smets and Wouters [54] and Woodford [58].32. They
32See also Buiter [8] for an open economy version of the Buiter-Miller in￿ ation inertia model and Buiter
[9] for an analysis of optimal disin￿ ation policies and the case for gradualism in the Buiter-Miller Model.
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constant.33 The real equilibrium of these models is invariant under alternative constant
rates of in￿ ation.
The full current indexation rule assumes that the period t constrained price setters
index fully to the realisation of the period t aggregate price level. A slightly weaker
variant assumes indexation to the expected value of the current aggregate price level:
￿t;t￿1 = Et￿1￿t;t￿1 (90)
With (90), alternative deterministic in￿ ation sequences would be associated with identical
values of the model￿ s real equilibrium variables. Unanticipated in￿ ation would have real
e⁄ects, unless the authorities validate the core in￿ ation process by using their interest
rate and/or indirect tax instruments to achieve ￿t;t￿1 = Et￿1￿t;t￿1:
4 Optimal monetary policy with a distorted natural
level of output
Finally, consider the case where the authorities don￿ t have the ￿scal nous or ability to undo
the e⁄ects of monopoly power in the deterministic steady state through an appropriate
subsidy. For the model under consideration, we represent this by the restriction that the
33As pointed out in Buiter and Jewitt [14], the price level equation generated by the N-period staggered
overlapping relative money wage contract is an ARIMA(N-1, N-1) process, while the price level generated
by the N-period staggered, overlapping relative real wage process is an ARIMA (2N-2, 2N-2) process.
When N=2, this means that the relative money wage model has price level inertia (an ARIMA (1,1)
process) but not in￿ ation inertia, while the relative real wage model has in￿ ation persistence (an ARIMA
(2,2) process. Of course, the relative money wage process with N=3 also generates an ARIMA (2,2)
process for the price level. Unless one knows N a-priori, there is an observationally equivalent relative
money wage model for every relative wage model. For some reason, the empirical literature seems to
be stuck on the N-2 case. With yearly contracts this may make sense if the unit period of analysis
and measurement is a year. However, if the true length of the typical (US) wage contract is 2 years,
but contracts are negotiated every quarter and the distribution of contract renewals is uniform over the
year, then, taking the quarter to be the unit period, N=8. The relative money wage model would imply
an ARIMA(7,7) for the general price level (using quarterly data) and the relative real wage money an
ARIMA(12,12) process. Plenty of in￿ ation persistence therefore from both models and, I would think,
a di¢ cult task of discriminating between them using, say, 160 or 200 quarterly observations.
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1
(1 + ￿t)[1 + ￿t(j)]
= 1 for all t;j: (91)
This does not preclude the indirect tax rate ￿t from being used to drive any required
wedge between the rate of consumer price in￿ ation required by the OQM rule and the
optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation. Benigno and Woodford [4],[5] refer to this as the
case of a distorted (deterministic) steady state. When monopoly power is not neutralised,
the natural level of output ￿ Yt (the level of output that would be produced under full price
￿ exibility) is below the e¢ cient level of output Y ￿
t . When the deterministic steady state
natural level of output is ine¢ cient (in our case, too low), the in￿ ation-neutral rate of
producer price in￿ ation (the rate that validates core in￿ ation) does not in general equal
the optimal rate of producer price in￿ ation if a steady-state gap between the actual and
core rates of producer price in￿ ation can in￿ uence the steady-state level of output. The
weak consistency assumption (26f) made in this paper, that even the most intellectu-
ally challenged dunderhead price setter would, in a deterministic steady state, align his
indexation rule with the (forever constant) actual rate of in￿ ation, precludes the pos-
sibility that, from the ￿ supply side￿of the economy, di⁄erences in steady-state in￿ ation
rates would be associated with di⁄erent levels of steady-state output. However, Calvo,
Benigno and Woodford do not impose (26f) or a similar minimal long-run consistency
restriction on their indexation rules. Not surprisingly, rather Old-Keynesian implications
follow.
As in the earlier papers by Woodford and in Woodford￿ s book [58], the Benigno and
Woodford papers [4] and [5] consider a (log) linear approximation at a deterministic steady
state with zero in￿ ation.34 In Woodford ([58]), when core in￿ ation is generated by partial,
one-period-lagged indexation (￿t;t￿1 = ￿
￿
t￿1;t￿2; ￿ < 1), steady state core in￿ ation equals
steady state actual in￿ ation (satis￿es (26f)) only when both are zero (this happens to be
34The Benigno and Woodford [4],[5] papers include nominal wage rigidities as well as nominal price
rigidities, but this does not a⁄ect the argument or the conclusions.
57
ECB
Working Paper Series No 609
April 2006the case in the deterministic steady state at which the linear approximation is taken).
In the Benigno and Woodford models, as in the original Calvo model, core in￿ ation is
always zero because the constrained price setters keep their nominal prices constant (that
is, ￿t;t￿1 = 1): Again, 91 is satis￿ed only in a zero in￿ ation deterministic steady state,
and an in￿ ation-neutral equilibrium requires ￿t;t￿1 = ￿t;t￿1 = 1:
With this steady-state distortion - a sub-optimal level of market goods production
- the OQM rule has the desirable property, beyond eliminating shoe-leather costs, that
it eliminates the second (Austrian) distortion making for a sub-optimal level of market
goods production: a share ￿ of market goods purchases is made with cash which earns
a lower return, when im < i than is available through the sale of credit goods or the
retention for own use as leisure of the endowment of potential labour time.
However, with the natural level of output below the e¢ cient level, rules for producer
price in￿ ation that cause actual producer price in￿ ation to exceed core producer price
in￿ ation will systematically and persistently boost the actual and natural levels of output
of market goods and bring them closer to the e¢ cient level.
Let ￿t;t￿1 ￿ ln￿t;t￿1;!t;t￿1 = ln￿t;t￿1; yt ￿ lnYt; ￿ yt = ln ￿ Yt and y￿
t = lnY ￿
t : Given
monopoly power and the suboptimal use of taxes and subsidies postulated in (91), ￿ yt < y￿
t:
Woodford [58] shows that his pricing model (which is also the one in this paper) can, to
a log-linear approximation, be written as follows:
￿t;t￿1 ￿ !t;t￿1 ￿ ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt) + ￿Et(￿t+1;t ￿ !t+1;t); ￿ > 0: (92)
The same applies to the Benigno and Woodford models (where in addition !t;t￿1 =
!t+1;t = 0). Welfare-reducing relative price distortions are created whenever ￿t;t￿1 6=
!t;t￿1 for all t: However, if ￿ yt < y￿
t because of the presence of uncorrected monopoly
power, there will be welfare gains from keeping actual in￿ ation ahead of core in￿ ation.
E.g. with ￿t;t￿1 ￿ !t;t￿1 = ￿ > 0; we have
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￿1(1 ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿ yt:
Actual output can be kept above the natural level of output and thus can be brought
closer to (or set equal to) the e¢ cient level of output. When !t;t￿1 ￿ 0 (the special case
considered by Benigno and Woodford), (92) implies:
yt = ￿ yt + ￿
￿1(￿t;t￿1 ￿ ￿Et￿t+1;t):
Across deterministic steady states, ￿ = (1￿￿)￿1￿(y￿￿ y) - an upward-sloping long-run
Phillips curve. The constant rate of in￿ ation that supports the e¢ cient level of output
is given by
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1￿(y
￿ ￿ ￿ y): (93)
The optimal rate of in￿ ation in this case would be somewhere between zero (the core in-
￿ ation validating rate that minimizes relative price distortions) and the positive in￿ ation
rate given in (93).
The reason why optimal in￿ ation policy in the Benigno and Woodford models does
not validate core producer price in￿ ation is the presence of a long-run non-vertical Phillips
curve and the associated permanent e⁄ect of fully anticipated in￿ ation on output. This
may have been an acceptable speci￿cation in 1926 (see Fisher [28]) or even in 1958
(see Phillips [52]), but not today, more than 30 years since the contributions of Phelps
[48][49][50][51], Friedman [32], and Lucas [39][40][41][42] and the vast theoretical and
empirical literature they spawned. A robust in￿ ation target cannot be based on ad-hoc
in￿ ation non-neutralities resulting from price setters￿arbitrary and implausible indexation
rules.
Finally, the proposition that optimal in￿ ation validates core in￿ ation is also applicable
to the "sticky information" or "inattentive price setters" version of the Phillips curve
proposed by Mankiw and Reis [45] (see also [53] and [2]). Assume for simplicity that the
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(yt ￿ ￿ yt) +
1 ￿ $
$




JEt￿1￿j [￿t + &￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt) + ￿ut]:
& > 0
In this case $ is the fraction of wage setters that obtain new information about the
state of the economy in any given period and incorporate this in their recomputed optimal
plans; ut is an increasing function of the gap between the actual period-t mark-up and
the value of the mark-up in the deterministic steady state.35 De￿ning core in￿ ation in
the sticky-information Phillips curve as (1￿$)
P1
j=0 $JEt￿1￿j [￿t + &￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt) + ￿ut];
the optimal in￿ ation policy is once more to set actual in￿ ation, ￿t; equal to core in￿ ation,
thus ensuring that yt = ￿ yt ￿ &ut:
5 Conclusion: Old Keynesian wine in New-Keynesian
bottles
I have analysed the in￿ ation rate associated with optimal monetary policy and either
optimal or constrained but supportive tax policy in a model that is representative of the
modern mainstream of dynamic stochastic (mostly) optimising macroeconomic general
equilibrium tradition. The implications of the analysis are clear. The optimal rate
of producer price in￿ ation validates (con￿rms or fully accommodates) the core in￿ ation
process generated by constrained price setters - whatever that is. The optimal interest rate
policy is given by the ￿ Optimal Quantity of Money￿rule, that the ￿nancial opportunity




























(1 + ￿t)[1 + ￿t(j)]:
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be set freely by the authorities, there is no unique consumer price in￿ ation rate associated
with the optimal monetary rule. By varying the risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds
(while keeping it equal to the risk-free nominal interest rate on money), any sequence
of consumer price in￿ ation rates, positive or negative, can be supported by an optimal
monetary policy. With an exogenously given zero nominal interest rate on money, the
consumer price in￿ ation rate associated with the optimal monetary policy is the consumer
price in￿ ation rate supported by a zero risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds. In a
deterministic steady state that would be a negative consumer price in￿ ation rate equal
to minus the rate of time preference.
Woodford ([58]) analysed models similar to those used in this paper. After considering
the Calvo price setting model with a number of indexation rules, he reaches to following
conclusion, which is starkly di⁄erent from that of this paper: "Thus aggregate price
stability is a su¢ cient condition for the absence of price dispersion in the present simple
framework" (p. 405). "At the same time, in most cases, it is also a necessary condition"
(p. 405); and: "...in a model with staggered pricing and full indexation to a lagged price
index, price stability is not necessary for the absence of price dispersion; it is simply
necessary that the in￿ation rate be constant over time. But again this is a highly special
case. If the indexation parameter ￿ takes any value other than one, only zero in￿ation
is consistent with an absence of price dispersion". (p. 406).
To be correct, the last part of the last sentence of this quote should be "..., zero
in￿ ation is the only constant rate of in￿ ation consistent with an absence of suboptimal
price dispersion".
Woodford recognises further on (in Chapter 6 of Woodford [58]), that his analysis of
the relationship between relative price dispersion and the aggregate in￿ ation rate only
implies that zero in￿ ation should be the objective of monetary policy if there are no
shoe-leather and no Austrian (cash-good vs. credit good) distortions in the economy.
Even if monetary distortions are absent, the results of this paper are di⁄erent from those
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proposition that, in the class of models under consideration, price stability is necessary
or su¢ cient for optimality. First, the lagged partial indexation rule for which Woodford
establishes that zero in￿ ation is necessary for optimality is implausible and inappropriate
for an analysis of how the economy would perform under alternative non-zero constant
in￿ ation targets. With partial indexation and constant indirect taxes, there can be no
constant in￿ ation rate other than zero in a deterministic steady state. The relative price
anomalies, cross-sectionally and over time, that result from this arbitrary indexation
rule under any non-zero constant rate of in￿ ation, would lead constrained price setters
to abandon the Woodford indexation function as they learned about the relationship
between their indexation rules and the behaviour of their relative prices and their pro￿ts.
The simplest plausible alternative to the Calvo pricing model with Woodford￿ s index-
ation function is the natural modi￿cation of the pure Calvo model that assumes that free
price setters choose not a ￿xed nominal price but a ￿xed relative price until their next
random opportunity for setting the relative price freely. Individual money prices then
adjust in line with the aggregate producer price level to maintain this relative price until
the next free pricing opportunity. In this model, there is full current indexation and the
real equilibrium is independent of the rate of in￿ ation. Reasonable alternative relative
price indexation rules result in the real equilibrium being invariant under alternative fully
anticipated in￿ ation sequences or under alternative constant in￿ ation rates.
The second reason the results of this paper di⁄er from those of Woodford hold for
any price indexation rule, including Woodford￿ s. I assume that the authorities are
capable of implementing a very simple nominal interest rate rule and/or a very simple
feedback rule for the indirect tax rate. Under these rules, the producer price core in￿ ation
process is validated by policy and any in￿ ation non-neutralities in the private price setting
mechanism are neutralised. The OQM rule is optimal under any price indexation rule if
the nominal interest rate and/or the indirect tax rate can be used responsively in this way.
Woodford implicitly assumes either that interest rate-setting and tax-setting authorities
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they can only target a constant rate of in￿ ation.
This paper does not argue that there are no valid arguments in favour of price stability
(de￿ned as zero in￿ ation for some appropriate aggregate price or cost-of-living index) as
an objective, or even the overriding objective, of monetary policy. All it says is that in
the class of models considered in this paper, price stability is not a property of optimal
monetary policy if either the private price setters are capable of learning or the tax
authorities are capable of implementing a simple feedback rule for the nominal interest
rate and/or the indirect tax rate. Woodford￿ s argument that price stability is optimal
when the natural output level is e¢ cient and Benigno and Woodford￿ s argument that a
positive in￿ ation rate is optimal when the natural output level is ine¢ ciently low, are
both examples of Old Keynesian wine in New Keynesian bottles: both depend on the
existence and persistence of the same ad-hoc in￿ ation-non-neutralities in wage and/or
price setting that brought us the non-vertical long-run Phillips curve.
The key results of this paper, that optimal monetary policy should implement the
Optimal Quantity of Money rule and that optimal producer price in￿ ation validates
(fully accommodates) core producer price in￿ ation, are not robust to two important
extensions. The ￿rst is the introduction of constraints on the ability of the authorities to
impose lump-sum taxes or make lump-sum transfers. With such constraints, seigniorage
revenues, that is, the real resources appropriated by the authorities through the issuance
of base money, can become a valuable source of revenue for the authorities. When the
interest rate on money is zero, this may raise the in￿ ation rate associated with optimal
monetary policy.36
The second extension is menu costs, that is, the explicit consideration of the real
36For seigniorage (or the anticipated in￿ ation tax on base money) to matter, we also have to impose
constraints on the ability of the authorities to raise distortionary tax rates. Without this, all the
government￿ s current and future revenue needs could be satis￿ed in the initial period through what
amounts to a capital levy. If any non-monetary nominal debt is outstanding, it may also be necessary
to impose a limit on the government￿ s ability to in￿ ict capital losses on the private owners of nominal
public debt through an unanticipated jump in the initial price level.
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papers of Caplin and Spulber [20] and Caplin and Leahy [21]. Such menu costs should be
interpreted broadly to include the time, e⁄ort and inconvenience of measuring, computing
and calculating with an inconvenient yardstick whose length varies from period to period.
The implications of menu costs for the optimal rate of in￿ ation depend crucially on the
details of how menu costs are modeled. It makes a di⁄erence whether a real sunk cost is
incurred every time a nominal price is changed, or only when a new contract (which may
involve indexation clauses) is negotiated. Nominal price changes that are the result of the
mechanical implementation of an invariant indexation rule may have lower menu costs
than those that are the result of bargaining between buyers and sellers or the outcome
of an auction. If menu costs are assumed to be particularly important for the goods and
services that make up the cost-of-living index, this would drive the optimal in￿ ation rate
of the cost of living index closer to zero. If, as seems more plausible, menu costs are
especially important for money wages (negotiating and bargaining over wages, whether
bilaterally or through organised labour unions and/or employers￿associations is costly
and time-consuming), a zero rate of money wage in￿ ation would be a natural focal point
of monetary policy. With positive labour productivity growth, zero wage in￿ ation would
imply a negative rate of in￿ ation for the cost of living, consumer and producer price
indices.
The marriage of conventional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory, charac-
terised by homogeneity of degree zero of all real variables in nominal prices and nomi-
nal endowments with ad-hoc nominal wage and/or price rigidities (whether exempli￿ed
by the Calvo-style New-Keynesian Phillips curve explored in this paper, by the sticky-
information Mankiw-Reis Phillips curve or by the earlier staggered overlapping nominal
wage contracts models of Taylor or staggered overlapping real wage contracts of Buiter
and Jewitt) was from the start a marriage of inconvenience. The distortions caused by
nominal price rigidities are a sub-optimal degree of relative price dispersion; formal or
informal price indexation rules that do not su⁄er from persistent, indeed permanent,
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takes place. If the private price setting mechanism su⁄ers from persistent in￿ ation
non-neutralities, simple policy rules involving only minor tinkering with the interest rate
and/or the aggregate indirect tax rate will make these distortions disappear.
This paper demonstrates conclusively that the New-Keynesian approach it surveys
does not contain the building blocks for welfare economic foundations of price stability
as a target (let alone the overriding target) of monetary policy.
may be time to stop hanging ever more small rigidities, frictions, ad-hoc behavioural
regularities and other New-Keynesian ornaments on the old dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium Christmas tree. The search for a welfare economic justi￿cation, grounded in
solid microfoundations, for targeting price stability is back at square one.
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